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NOTES AND COMMENTS
REAL PROPERTY
FIXTURES- RECORDING OF CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT
As NOTICE TO PURCHASERS OF REALTY
A furnace was sold on a conditional sale contract which provided
that it remain personal property. The contract was recorded under
G.C. 8568. A prior mortgagee of the realty who received no actual
notice of the conditional sale contract, foreclosed and purchased the
realty. The controversy is between such purchaser without actual notice
of the conditional sale contract and the furnace company, the vendor
named in it. The lower court held for the furnace company. The Court
of Appeals for Trumbull County reversed that judgment. The Supreme
Court held that a furnace is a fixture and that the recording of the con-
ditional sale contract did not give constructive notice to the subsequent
purchaser of the realty.'
Using the threefold test of attachment, appropriation, and intention
as laid down in Teaff v. Hewitt,2 the court found that a hot air furnace
is a fixture. Previous Ohio lower court decisions on this question are
conflicting' as are the holdings of the courts in other states. The problem
involved in considerably broader than the sale of hot air furnaces. Re-
frigerators and refrigerating systems, oil burning water supply systems,
greasing pits, sprinkler systems, lighting fixtures, gas ranges, built-in
beds, elevators, bowling alleys, concrete silos, and industrial equipment
of every description have been sold on contracts which have provided
that they remain the property of the vendor. The courts have held that
they are fixtures in so far as it may affect third parties without notice of
the agreement.
Conceding that a furnace is a fixture, the controversy between the
vendor and a prior mortagee of the realty to which it has been attached
was determined in favor of the prior mortgagee in Twentieth Cent.
Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp.4 The author-
ities are reviewed in a note in a previous number of the journal.' The
provision that the article is to remain personalty after installation and
until paid for would be binding between the parties' and anyone who
'Holland Furnace Co. v. The Trumbull Savings and Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48,
i9 N.E. (zd) 237, 13 Ohio Op. 32S (939).
x Ohio St. 5x, S9 Am. Dec. 634 (1853).
S Holland Furnace Co. v. Joy, 3z Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 17 (1934); Twentieth Century
Heating & Ventilating Corp. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App. 188, 1o N.E.
(zd) 229, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 56, 6 Ohio Op. z3 (1937).
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took with notice.' It would not affect a subsequent bona fide purchaser
without notice of the contract.8
This is the first clear holding that, under the Ohio act, a recorded
contract of conditional sale of a chattel which becomes a part of the
realty does not give constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
realty. The ruling was to be expected. It is in accord with prior deci-
sions dealing with chattel mortgages.' Decisions under the chattel mort-
gage section on the question of notice are applicable to questions of condi-
tional sale." The decision is consistent with the common practice of
tide searchers who do not look outside of the real property records of the
county in which the realty is located. Only those instruments filed in
the county of the situs of the real property give constructive notice. The
contract of conditional sale may be filed in the county where the person
signing the instrument resided at the time of its execution." This may
or may not be the county where the realty to which it is subsequently
attached lies. It can never be seriously suggested that a conditional sale
contract filed in any one of the eighty-eight counties in Ohio should give
constructive notice to a purchaser of real estate located in another county.
Undoubtedly this decision, though consistent with the rules of law upon
which it is based, works a hardship upon the conditional vendor of prop-
erty which may become a fixture. The Ohio Supreme Court is of the
opinion that, "the law herein expressed furnishes the better rule since it
gives certainty to real estate tides and avoids confusion and litigation.'
Admitting the truth of this statement does not relieve the conditional
vendor from his plight. A number of suggestions have been advanced
to aid him.
(I) The Ohio Supreme Court suggests the mechanics lien. This is
highly unsatisfactory for the purpose of the vendor. Tide to his property
passes to the purchaser. He cannot repossess it upon default of payments
nor can he foreclose upon the article itself but must bring foreclosure on
the whole of the realty, a highly troublesome and expensive procedure,
one pregnant with business-destroying publicity. The mechanics lien is
definitely not the answer to the installment vendor who wishes quietly
and inexpensively to repossess his property.
(2) A real property mortgage has been suggested. 3 It is open to
'Simmons v. Pierce, 16 Ohio St. 2x5 (s86S)j Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass.
279 (z867); Haven v. Emery, 33 N.H. 66 (I86S).
' Case Mfg. Co. v. Garven, supra; Brennan v. Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 (1864).
'Brennan v. Whitaker, supra.
'o Columbus Merchandise Co. v. Kline, 248 Fed. 296, 15 Ohio L.R. 525 (1917).
1 G.C. 8568.
'Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings and Loan Co., supra.
'
2Brennan v. Whitaker, supra; Garven v. Hogue and Donaldson, 9 Ohio D.R. 5ol,
14 W.L.B. 175 (1885).
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the same objections and the additional difficulty of the ingrained reluc-
tance of home owners to subject their property to mortgages.
(3) Sec. of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted in ten states
but not in Ohio, provides that recordation of the instrument shall give
constructive notice and that the instrument shall be filed in the office
where a deed of the realty would be recorded. The vendor has a right
to his property unless its removal would cause material injury to the free-
hold. The "institutional theory" of material damage, developed in New
Jersey 4 and subsequently adopted in Pennsylvania," substantially de-
feats the purpose of the act by considering the removal of any fixture
essential to the functioning of the property as an institution as a material
injury. The Pennsylvania legislature avoided the operation of the insti-
tutional theory by amending sec. 7 so that, upon proper filing, the condi-
tional vendor may always remove his goods but is liable to a prior
mortgagee or owner of the realty for the physical damage done to the
structure."0 The New York Court of Appeals has not adopted this view
but takes from the operation of the law only those fixtures, the removal
of which would cause actual physical damage to the realty.'
In the definite belief that there does exist a need, it is submitted that
the problem could be solved in Ohio by legislation of a nature similar to
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act or by admission of the conditional
sale contract to the real property records by legislation to that effect.
The objection that it would not be found in a normal search would then
be overcome. A conditional sale contract filed with the real property
records today would not give constructive notice. No statutory provision
is made for its presence there' 8 and the filing and recording of an instru-
ment for the recording of which the law makes no provision, is without
legal effect."0 Thus a record of a contract whereby owners of real prop-
erty covenated not to sell to one not of the caucasian race does not con-
stitute constructive notice because its record is not provided for by stat-
ute. ' If there is any question whether the article is a fixture, duplicates
might be filed, one with the real property records. This provision would
detract but little from the effectiveness of an already confused real prop-
erty system of notice. R.C.H.
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